Anyone who studies the history of the SEC knows that most decisions are made by consensus.  Those days are over.

The difficulty in reaching consensus can be worsened by the existence of representation of both parties on the body.  The five person commission is prohibited by law from having more than three persons of the same party.  See 15 USC 78d ("Not more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and in making appointments members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable.").  Ordinarily, therefore, the party in the White House gets three seats (and a majority) and the party out of power receives the other two (although there have been cases where the non-majority slots went to independents). 

Of course, its possible to have appointees who represent both parties but have the same philosophical approach to regulation.  In other words, party affiliation isn't by itself a guarantee of diverse viewpoints.

The current Commission, however, does have a diversity of viewpoints that break down along party lines.  The Commission currently has a full complement.  Schapiro, Walter and Aguilar sit in the democratic slots; Paredes and Casey occupy the republican ones.  Four of the current appointees were put on the Commission by President Bush.  President Obama has only had a single appointment so far, the chair, Schapiro. 

Particularly in the area of corporate governance and corporate disclosure, it looks as if any pretense at consensus no longer exists at the Commission.  More decisions seem to be made by a 3-2 vote.  Examples?  The Amendments to Rule 452 of the NYSE to prohibit discretionary voting by brokers in uncontested elections for the board of directors; the proposed rules giving shareholders the right to access.  The most recent is the interpretive guidance on climate change disclosure.    

Note that the two dissenting commissioners (always Paredes and Casey) have done so in rules sought by the self regulatory organization (the amendment to Rule 452), rules that were merely proposals  (access), and interpretive guidance.  Commentary suggests that the interpetive guidance on climate control merely repeats what lawyers already tell their clients.   In other words, the two in opposition felt the need to object to a release that largely reiterates rather than changes the law.

This sort of divisiveness is, it seems, increasingly common in the political realm.  Now, apparently, it is becoming increasingly common in the administrative realm.  One of the consequences is, ironically, a reduction in influence for the dissenters.  In shaping access or repealing the limits in Rule 452, a consensus approach would likely give the dissenters influence on the final terms of the regulation.  Yet by objecting, particularly at the onset, the dissenters largely make themselves irrelevant to the shaping of the final product.  As for the length of time on the commission, Casey's term expires in 2011.  Paredes has until 2013.