Churchill Trial: CU's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

CU has filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful termination claim on the basis that the Board of Regents are a constitutionally created—and therefore governmental—body which was acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, and is therefore immune from lawsuit. This claim was previously preserved while going forward with the jury trial.

The motion asserts that the Board of Regents, created under Article VIII of the Colorado Constitution, occupies a “unique position in Colorado’s governmental structure.” Since the Regents have constitutional power to “enact laws for the government of the University,” their actions in doing so have the same immunity from personal claims provided to other governmental actors. Judicial immunity is provided to judges, prosecutors and grand jurors on the basis that when such officials perform functions necessary to the judicial system, quasi-judicial immunity creates a bar to liability. This immunity prevents someone receiving an adverse judgment from going after the judge or jury.

The motion further asserts that immunity is not a product of governmental position, but of functioning in judicial capacity. Citing several Colorado and Tenth Circuit cases involving school district and university teacher terminations, CU notes that “where an official applies ‘preexisting legal standards or policy considerations to present or past facts presented to the governmental body, then one can say with reasonable certainty that the governmental body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.’” CU applies these rulings to the facts of Prof Churchill’s termination, emphasizing that a) the likelihood of litigation against the Regents in the event of a decision to fire someone is just the sort of retaliation that immunity is designed to prevent, and b) that the Regents provided Prof Churchill with enough procedural protections and due process (through the many series of hearings and committees) to qualify for quasi-judicial immunity.

“Prof Churchill will undoubtedly claim that the safeguards [of due process] were insufficient because the jury returned a verdict in his favor, but the jury’s verdict is not the test by which a court measures judicial immunity. Were it otherwise, a quasi-judicial immunity would depend upon the outcome of the lawsuit, but the courts have been clear that the question is whether there are safeguards in the judicial framework designed to control unlawful conduct.”

Professor Churchill’s response must be filed within twenty days; we will report further at that time.

Primary materials for this case may be found at the DU Corporate Governance website.

Comments

[Seansky]

The problem with this argument is that there were not pre-existing legal standards or policy considerations in this case. By-and-large, the committees had no academic rubric to follow, and in fact violated many academic standards in the reports that they issued.

The investigative committee, for example, was just the opposite. It operated as a new entity devoid of precedent or sensible guidelines.

The only committee with any precedent and standards or policy to fall back upon was the Privilege and Tenure committee, which found in favor of only a suspension, and knocked out a number of the charges.

The president and the regents, who ultimately suggested and approved, respectively, the decision to terminate were also acting without reference ot policies about privileged and tenure, or any set of academic standards. Indeed, they ignored the recommendation of their committees, both in regard to the number of legitimate charges and suggested penalties. This, among other reasons, shows anything but due process, and procedural protections, but rather kangaroo courts.

Therefore it was not quasi-judicial, but rather the facts were applied without reference to the law.

Another argument can be made that free speech takes precedent over judicial immunity, but that is much more difficult.