An Ace or a Whiff? Professional Tennis Players Association Adds the Grand Slams to its Antitrust Lawsuit
On March 18, 2025, the Professional Tennis Players Association (“PTPA”) served a message to not only the world of tennis but also to the broader sports industry: antitrust behavior does not belong in professional sports. The PTPA, founded by former and current tennis players, advocates for players’ rights and interests and aims to maximize the power of a united player organization. (PTPA) The PTPA, accompanied by 14 named professional tennis players (and collectively with the PTPA, the “Complainants”), filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against four tennis organizations, including the Association of Tennis Professionals (“ATP”) and Women’s Tennis Association (“WTA”). Compl. ¶ 3, Pospisil v. ATP Tour, Inc., 1:25-cv-02207, (S.D.N.Y. Mar 18, 2025). These two organizations dominate and control the sport by being the two main governing bodies and controlling the rankings for both men’s and women’s players. (Wilson). These organizations require that their players compete in 8-12 specific tournaments to earn points, and playing in non-sanctioned tournaments will not earn players any points. Id. Points and rankings play a vital role in players’ overall reputation and earnings throughout their careers. (Edara). The suit alleges that the defendants, acting with the four Grand Slam organizers, “have formed a cartel, acquired monopsony power in the market for the services of professional tennis players, erected barriers to entry to lock out competitors and preserve their own artificial market position, and abused their powers to the harm of players, the sport, fans, and competition.” Pospisil, 1:25-cv-02207 at ¶ 3. Further, after settlement negotiations with the Grand Slam organizers failed to produce an agreement by the PTPA’s October 20, 2025, deadline, the Complainants filed a motion to add them to the lawsuit. (Rob Schaefer, Sports Business Journal). This article explores whether the PTPA’s antitrust lawsuit can succeed in dismantling a system where the ATP and WTA appear to control tournament rankings, effectively forcing players into sanctioned events while restricting their earning potential and bargaining power.
At the heart of PTPA’s lawsuit is the primary concern that the existing player compensation and competition schedule reduces opportunities for PTPA. The prize money at stake in the Grand Slams equals roughly 15 to 20 percent of those tournament organizers’ total revenue. (Charlie Eccleshare, New York Times). By contrast, the revenue share in other major sports, including individual sports such as golf, can exceed 50 percent. Id. During the US Open, for example, PTPA alleges that revenues from the sale of its specialty cocktail exceeded $12 million, yet the combined prize payouts to the champions across gender divisions totaled $8 million. Pospisil, 1:25-cv-02207 at ¶ 49. Additionally, the allocation of the prize earnings favors only the top few players, which raises concerns about the competition schedule. Players must compete to earn money, but only a certain number of players can compete at any given event. (Charlie Eccleshare, New York Times). Players earn points for their wins only in specific tournaments, thereby incentivizing them to compete only in the organization’s sanctioned events. Id. Expanding the schedule to include more tournaments with more prize money may not be a favorable solution, as it would elongate the already 11-month competition schedule. Id. In addition to concerns regarding compensation and schedule, the Complainants also cite issues in name, image, and likeness, as well as abusive investigative processes and illegal arbitration agreements. Pospisil, 1:25-cv-02207 at ¶¶ 142, 243, 268.
Antitrust allegations are not a new issue in the world of sports. All major US sports – baseball, football, basketball, and hockey – have fought against the monopolization of their leagues. Professional sports present a unique challenge: teams and leagues must coordinate to maintain fairness and efficient operations, yet that coordination cannot unlawfully restrain competition. Many leagues rely on collective bargaining agreements (“CBA(s)”) to resolve pay and labor disputes without court intervention. (US Legal). These CBAs help protect athletes’ rights and address issues such as player salaries, free agency, and the season schedule. (Justia). In the US, sports leagues and their individual teams often operate as joint ventures that impose three types of rules: “(1) rules governing the ownership and acquisition of player contracts, (2) rules governing territorial rights, and (3) rules governing television and radio contracts.” (Leah Farzin, Jeffrey S Moorad Sports Law Journal). These cooperative agreements help stabilize leagues but may also eliminate competition between teams, prompting antitrust challenges for athletes. Id. Once a complaint has successfully alleged the requirements of an antitrust suit, which include showing a relevant market, proof of market power, proof of anticompetitive conduct, and injury because of such conduct, courts will analyze whether the conduct constitutes a per se violation of antitrust laws or apply the Rule of Reason to weigh procompetitive benefits against anticompetitive harm. Id. This pleading standard places a high burden on the alleging party, with a lot of uncertainty in the success of their claims.
Sports in Europe, under the governance of the EU, are regulated in much of the same way as those in the US, but the sports governing bodies (“SGB(s)”) also oversee all participants in a sport. These governing bodies are given autonomy to regulate their sports however they wish within the bounds of the EU laws. (European Union). Since the SGBs operate as a hierarchy in the sport, they are able to control the actions of the individual professional leagues and, in turn, control the actions of each professional athlete. (Leah Farzin, Jeffrey S Moorad Sports Law Journal). Courts in the EU also apply a similar analysis in antitrust cases and allow parties to justify their anticompetitive actions in special circumstances. Id.
The sport of professional tennis is governed and organized largely differently from that of many other professional sports. The ATP, which began as an organization designed to protect the players’ rights, now engages in activities that explicitly restrain competition. One example alleged in the Complaint is the location choice for major tournaments being chosen to benefit the CEO, instead of allowing bids to host the event, as would be the practice in a free market. Pospisil, 1:25-cv-02207 at ¶ 69. Another allegation is the denial of allowing an independent tournament, the BNP Paribas Open, to raise prize money, because it would pressure the ATP and Grand Slam tournaments to raise their prizes beyond their agreed-upon amount. Id. at ¶ 129. In addition, the players themselves are considered independent contractors, not employees of the various organizations. (Rachel Reed, Harvard Law Today). This distinction means that players do not have the power to collectively bargain for better pay or competition schedules, as athletes in other sports leagues can. Pospisil, 1:25-cv-02207 at ¶ 179. When players join the ATP, they must sign a “Consent and Agreement Form” that binds them to all of the organization’s rules, bylaws, resolutions, and regulations. Id. at ¶ 73. The Complainants contend that the WTA has a similar structure. Id. at ¶ 83.
The players face an uphill battle after adding the four Grand Slams to their suit. Although the lawsuit was originally filed in New York, London, and Brussels (EU), the addition of the Grand Slams now brings France and Australia into the case as well, forcing the Complainants to fight this across the globe. Because anticompetition claims come with several pleading requirements, the ability to convince one court of anticompetitive claims is challenging enough; convincing multiple courts across multiple continents is even more difficult. The players run the risk of receiving contradicting outcomes, making it that much harder to navigate their rights when playing internationally. Additionally, the Complainants face the risk of being forced out of court due to their mandatory arbitration agreements, which are unlikely to yield the results they are fighting for. (Rachel Reed, Harvard Law Today). If this suit is successful, the door could also be open for a rival tennis league to enter the market, incentivizing players to leave the Grand Slams and the ATP, significantly weakening the grip those organizations have on professional tennis. (Ben Cisneros & Sam Comb Morgan Sports Law).
Rival sports leagues have already seen relative success in global sports with the emergence of LIV Golf as a rival league to the Professional Golf Association (“PGA”). LIV Golf was created as a way to “reinvigorate” professional golf by offering players higher payouts and a more “player-focused alternative organization. (Alan Blinder, Tariq Panja & Andrew Das, New York Times). LIV Golf’s success is still a work in progress, as the PGA still holds a firm grip on professional golf, but it does show potential for other sports, such as tennis, to follow in its footsteps. Id.
Should the Complainants succeed in their case, it could serve as a catalyst for much-needed change in the world of professional tennis. Among other changes, the Complainants ask for a declaratory judgment making PTPA members employees of the ATP and WTA, so that they “are entitled to rights and remedies inherent to employee status,” including the ability to unionize. (Charlie Eccleshare, New York Times). In an ideal world, this suit would lead to better pay and more autonomy for the players, but at the very least, it will hopefully open the door for negotiations to improve player pay, tournament schedules, and overall player well-being. Id.
The PTPA's lawsuit faces significant hurdles: coordinating antitrust claims across multiple jurisdictions, overcoming mandatory arbitration clauses, and convincing courts that the coordination necessary for running a sport crosses into anticompetitive conduct. But if successful, the implications extend far beyond tennis. The case could reshape how international sports with centralized governing bodies operate, potentially forcing greater transparency in revenue sharing and giving athletes meaningful bargaining power. Whether that leads to a healthier competitive marketplace or fractures professional tennis into competing leagues remains to be seen. What's clear is that the monopolistic grip governing bodies have enjoyed for decades is finally facing serious legal scrutiny.